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BOOK REVIEWS
A Natural History of Natural Theology, by Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt. 
MIT Press, 2015. Pp. xvii + 246. $40.00 (hardcover).
JOSHUA C. THUROW, University of Texas at San Antonio
The cognitive science of religion has attracted increasing attention from an-
alytic philosophers of religion. Cognitive-evolutionary scientific theories 
of why humans have religious beliefs have, like counterpart explana-
tions of moral beliefs, raised the question of whether religious beliefs are 
grounded in a cognitive process that can be trusted. Debunking arguments 
hold that the cognitive-evolutionary explanations of religious beliefs show 
that these beliefs do not track the truth of the religious facts, and conclude 
that we should suspend judgment about these beliefs. One now typical 
response to the debunkers says that if one holds a religious belief on the 
basis of good reasons, then one’s belief may be justified. (See, e.g., Michael 
J. Murray and Jeffrey Schloss, “Evolutionary Accounts of Religion and 
the Justification of Religious Belief,” in Debating Christian Theism, ed. J. P. 
Moreland, Chad Meister, and Kaldoun A. Sweis (Oxford University Press, 
2013) and Joshua C. Thurow, “Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God 
to be Irrational? The Epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science of 
Religion,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 [2013]: 77–98.) 
And many people do believe on the basis of reasons that dwell at the heart 
of some natural theological arguments; if those reasons turn out to be good, 
then many people may—even after knowing full well about the cognitive-
evolutionary explanations of human religious beliefs—rationally maintain 
their religious beliefs.
But, what if debunking arguments sprout up amidst the field of natural 
theological arguments? Might human dispositions to accept these argu-
ments also be explained by naturally evolved cognitive mechanisms? 
And if so, might those dispositions fail to track the truth of those argu-
ments’ premises? In this informative and stimulating book, De Cruz and 
De Smedt aim to address these very questions—questions which, before 
the appearance of their book, have been rarely addressed. (Exceptions 
include a couple earlier articles by De Cruz and De Smedt; Derek Leben, 
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“When Psychology Undermines Beliefs,” Philosophical Psychology 27 
[2014]: 328–350; Thurow, “Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to 
be Irrational?”; Thurow, “Some Reflections on Cognitive Science, Doubt, 
and Religious Belief,” in The Roots of Religion, ed. Roger Trigg and Justin 
Barrett [Ashgate, 2014], 189–207; and Thurow, “Does the Scientific Study 
of Religion Cast Doubt on Theistic Beliefs?” in Challenges to Moral and 
Religious Belief, ed. Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain (Oxford University 
Press, 2014): 277–294.) Most of the book is devoted to arguing that vari-
ous natural theological arguments draw on certain cognitive mechanisms 
that are likely to be evolutionarily adaptive and maturationally natural, 
i.e., that arise early in an individual’s development without explicit in-
struction. They also discuss whether it follows that any of the natural 
theological arguments are debunked. De Cruz and De Smedt draw on a 
wealth of empirical studies to make their argument; indeed no other work 
to date has integrated anywhere near the number and diversity of studies 
as they have in investigating the cognitive foundations of natural theol-
ogy. For this, those interested in the cognitive science of religion and/or 
debunking arguments owe them many thanks. However, their discussion 
of the possible debunking implications of their argument suffers from 
some flaws. Despite those flaws, this book is an invaluable resource for 
future work on natural theology and the philosophical implications of the 
cognitive science of religion.
After an introductory chapter explaining natural theology and the cog-
nitive science of religion, and a second chapter summarizing parts of the 
contemporary cognitive scientific understanding of human cognitive abil-
ities, De Cruz and De Smedt spend six chapters exploring the cognitive 
foundations of a variety of arguments and issues in natural theology: how 
to think of God’s knowledge, the design argument, the cosmological argu-
ment, the moral argument, the argument from beauty, and the argument 
from miracles. Each of these six chapters explains its theistic argument in 
a sympathetic, historically sensitive way, argues that our assessment of the 
argument depends upon certain maturationally natural cognitive facul-
ties, and concludes with some discussion of the plausibility of the theistic 
argument in light of the authors’ account of its cognitive underpinnings. 
The book concludes with a chapter on whether these cognitive underpin-
nings debunk the arguments in toto. In this short review I shall examine 
their discussion of the cosmological argument as well as the final chapter 
since these chapters contain their most extensive discussion of debunking 
arguments. Very briefly, here’s what they say about the other arguments: 
the design argument is grounded in abilities to attribute functions to ob-
jects, to see objects as designed, and to make probabilistic inferences; the 
moral argument is grounded in moral realist intuitions; the argument from 
beauty is grounded in intuitions about beauty and the sublime; and the 
argument from miracles is grounded in various content and context biases 
regarding the transmission of testimony. All of these intuitions, abilities, 
and biases are maturationally natural. They believe some versions of the 
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moral argument are debunked, but that the arguments from beauty and 
miracles and a certain kind of cumulative-case design argument are not, 
although these arguments probably won’t be very persuasive unless one 
already has a high prior credence in God’s existence. Their discussion of 
the neglected argument from beauty is especially fascinating and should 
prove essential to future work on the argument.
Cosmological arguments proceed in two steps, each of which, De Cruz 
and De Smedt argue, depends for its plausibility on maturationally nat-
ural cognitive abilities. In the first step it is argued that there is a first 
cause. This step uses some version of the causal principle or the principle 
of sufficient reason. De Cruz and De Smedt cite studies that indicate that 
from a very young age humans are prone both to look for explanations/
causes for unexpected events and to find plausible unobserved or un-
observable causes such as mental states, physical forces, and biological 
essences. They also—to my mind implausibly—suggest that an empiri-
cally-confirmed disposition to prefer deterministic to stochastic causes/
explanations “inform(s)” (93) the commonly-drawn conclusion of step 1 
that the first cause necessarily exists. It’s not clear what they mean by “in-
forms,” but if it means something like “inclines us to believe” then it isn’t 
clear why a disposition to prefer deterministic causes would lead us to be 
inclined to think those causes necessarily exist. Indeed, we deny that most 
causes—even deterministic causes—necessarily exist. In step 2 it is argued 
that the first cause is God. They suggest that our (empirically supported) 
maturationally natural abilities to understand intentional/agential causes 
and to conceive of immaterial agents, together with dispositions to appeal 
to agential causes of the sudden motion of inanimate objects and to treat 
agential causes as requiring no further explanation, inclines us to find it 
plausible that the first cause is God.
De Cruz and De Smedt then argue that their theory of how our cogni-
tive dispositions incline us to accept the two steps of the cosmological 
argument cannot be used to debunk the argument. They argue that on an 
internalist theory of justification, cosmological arguments can increase a 
theist’s justification for belief by contributing to a more coherent world-
view. But, a nontheist would likely not be persuaded—again, because of a 
low prior credence for theism. They then argue that an externalist theory 
of justification opens up the following sort of debunking argument (DA): 
our cognitive tools are selected for reliability under normal circumstances 
that humans encountered in the environment in which selection occurred, 
but reliability is not selected for when those abilities are used for situa-
tions that are remote from the conditions under which they evolved. To apply 
our causal and agential intuitions to the universe and potential causes of 
the universe is to apply them in remote situations, but they are not reli-
able in those situations, so we should not trust them when they are used 
as grounds for the cosmological argument. De Cruz and De Smedt reject 
this argument on two grounds: they argue, first, that it assumes there is 
no God and second, that the argument would also undermine our use of 
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the causal principle in science since the domains of scientific experiment 
are also remote from the conditions in which our cognitive abilities arose. 
They call this latter problem the problem of collateral damage.
I agree that their theory of cognitive dispositions doesn’t undermine 
the cosmological argument, but I don’t think their arguments establish 
this. First, DA, which they used to target externalist justification can, with 
only very slight modification, attack internalist justification. On internalist 
views, evidence of unreliability counts as an undercutting defeater for 
justification—so, as long as we have evidence supporting the premises of 
DA, DA will also target internalist justification. Second, it isn’t clear that 
the cosmological argument increases the coherence of an internalist theist’s 
beliefs. What does it add? The theist already believes that God exists and 
that God is the creator of the universe who exercises providence over the 
universe. Those claims are already coherent. The cosmological argument 
doesn’t make the system more coherent, it just seems to illustrate the coher-
ence of the theistic system. Third, DA doesn’t assume that God doesn’t exist. 
A process can be unreliable regarding discerning p even if p is true, indeed 
even if p is necessarily true (e.g., suppose I guess that p and p is true or 
even necessarily true; even so, my guessing isn’t a reliable process). Fourth, 
John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths have developed a plausible response to 
the problem of collateral damage (“Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in 
Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion” in A New Science of Religion, ed. 
Gregory Dawes and James Maclaurin [Routledge, 2012], 133–146.). They 
grant that natural selection probably wouldn’t directly select for reliable 
beliefs about scientific matters. But, they argue that natural selection would 
select for reliable commonsense beliefs and methods (e.g., perceptual be-
liefs, memorial beliefs, basic induction) and on the basis of those we can 
come to have reason to trust our scientific methods. So, perhaps we can 
trust the causal principle when applied to commonsense situations, but 
then we can test whether the causal principle holds more generally by 
making a causal hypothesis, drawing out predictions of that hypothesis, 
and checking those predictions using perception (which is reliable). Thus, 
we can come to have good reason to not only trust scientific methods of 
inquiry, but also to apply the causal principle in scientific contexts.
In their final chapter, De Cruz and De Smedt consider a more gen-
eralized version of DA, used to target the justification for the premises 
of many of the theistic arguments altogether. They object to it using the 
generality problem for reliabilism. The processes—understood broadly—
underlying our beliefs in these premises are reliable because evolution 
likely has selected for cognitive mechanisms that generally yield the 
truth about the presence of causes and agents and intentional states. The 
processes—understood more narrowly to apply to beliefs about things 
that are out of the ordinary domain (i.e., that in which the mechanisms 
evolved)—may not be reliable. But, they say, we can’t tell which process 
matters for justification. Here, once again, prior belief in God plays a role. 
If you have a high prior in God’s existence, you’ll take it that God has 
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created these processes to be generally reliable and so you’ll think the 
broader process is more relevant. If you have a low prior in God’s exis-
tence, you’ll think our religious beliefs are likely false and so you’ll think 
the narrower process is more relevant. They conclude, “it seems that both 
theists and nontheists reach reasonable conclusions and are justified in 
holding them” (199).
Although I agree that the generality problem is a worry for externalist 
theories of justification, I think it is less worrisome when we’re simply 
interested in evidence of unreliability as a source of defeat, which is what 
debunking arguments try to give. For the latter, we want to take into ac-
count any evidence about the causes and circumstances of the use of the 
belief-forming process. Even if process P is generally reliable concerning 
my visual judgments, if I get evidence that it isn’t reliable concerning my 
color judgments, then I thereby obtain good reason to doubt my color 
judgments. So, the narrower belief-forming process is relevant to whether 
belief is defeated, even if we grant that the reliability of the broader belief-
forming process is sufficient for prima facie justification.
Despite these shortcomings in their discussion of debunking argu-
ments, this is a very good book that I recommend to all interested in the 
cognitive science of religion. It doesn’t end the discussion of whether the 
cognitive underpinnings of theistic arguments debunk those arguments, 
but it is undoubtedly an excellent place to start.
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God, Modality, and Morality, by William E. Mann. Oxford University Press, 
2015. Pp. ix + 369. $74.00 (hardcover).
WILLIAM F. VALLICELLA
This is a book philosophers of religion will want on their shelves. It col-
lects sixteen of William E. Mann’s previously published papers and 
includes “Omnipresence, Hiddenness, and Mysticism,” written for this 
volume. These influential papers combine analytic precision with histori-
cal erudition: in many places Mann works directly from the classical texts 
and supplies his own translations. Mann ranges masterfully over a wealth 
of topics from the highly abstract (divine simplicity, aseity, sovereignty, 
immutability, omnipresence) to the deeply existential (mysticism, divine 
love, human love and lust, guilt, lying, piety, hope). As the title suggests, 
the essays are grouped under three heads, God, Modality, and Morality.
A somewhat off-putting feature of some of these essays is their ram-
bling and diffuse character. In this hyperkinetic age it is a good writerly 
maxim to state one’s thesis succinctly at the outset and sketch one’s overall 
